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Introduction 
The London Stock Exchange is a vibrant capital market which attracts issuers from all over 
the world, bringing companies with diverse corporate governance practices and norms into 
the UK listed landscape. The dominant mode of corporate governance in UK public 
companies has historically been dispersed ownership.1 However, during the last decade or 
so, the UK Listing regime has found itself addressing unfamiliar governance issues arising at 
companies with a concentrated ownership structure. Such companies have typically 
originated from the natural resources/mining sectors of various developing economies, and 
initially appealed to investors due to their strong growth prospects.2 Unfortunately, a series 
of high profile scandals at Bumi (now renamed Asia Mineral Resources), Eurasian Natural 
Resources Corporation (now de-listed) and Essar Energy, have tarnished the reputation of 
such foreign listings and led the UK Listing Authority (the Financial Conduct Authority) to 
introduce new corporate governance standards as part of its Listing Regime for companies 
with controlling shareholders (thereafter ‘The Enhanced Listing Regime’). The new rules 
came into force in May 2014.3 
The Enhanced Listing Regime is essentially a measure of minority shareholder protection. It 
introduces several prescriptive corporate governance standards to protect minority 
shareholders in blockholder-controlled companies. These standards are novel in nature 
compared to the corporate governance standards that have been developed thus far in the 
UK and in other key listing regimes.  
Minority shareholder protections are important to listing regimes due the importance of 
legal and regulatory frameworks to economic and financial development. Although the 
                                                          
*Director of Corporate Governance and Professional Standards, Institute of Directors. 
**Reader in Laws, Faculty of Laws, University College London. 
1
 Brian R Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: British Businesses Transformed (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010); Janette Rutterford, ‘The Shareholder Voice: British and American Accents, 1890–1965’ (2012) 13 
Enterprise and Society 120. 
2
 Brian R Cheffins, ‘The Undermining of UK Corporate Governance?’ (2013) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2129686.  
3
 Financial Conduct Authority, Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Listing Regime and Further Consultation 
(November 2013). 
original La Porta et al thesis connecting law and finance4 has since been criticised for its 
broad brush approach, various methodological inadequacies5 and incongruence with 
empirical data,6 most commentators acknowledge that ‘law matters’ to certain extents in 
different contexts.7  
We analyse how the Enhanced Listing Regime works as a minority protection mechanism in 
blockholder-controlled companies. In the context of the UK equity market, developing 
standards for the governance of such companies is relatively unchartered territory. We 
therefore place the FCA’s pioneering efforts in the wider context of minority protection 
frameworks in global capital markets and engage in a comparative analysis to see if lessons 
can be learnt from elsewhere.  
Section A provides an overview of the Enhanced Listing Regime, and considers how and 
whether it addresses the governance issues arising out of block-held structures. We then 
undertake a comparison of the UK regime with the regimes in the New York and Hong Kong 
listed markets, focusing on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in Section B and Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) in Section C. These two regimes do not have dedicated 
standards to protect minority shareholders in block-held companies, but our comparative 
study is undertaken at a broad level to assess the nature and importance of minority 
protection frameworks in these leading capital markets.  
We have chosen the NYSE and SEHK as comparative subjects as they are significant global 
markets for equities, albeit with certain key differences. New York and Hong Kong are 
located within the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition of minority shareholder protection. However, 
the NYSE is a market which, although mainly composed of companies with dispersed 
ownership, also features some high profile block-held listed companies which have not, so 
far, raised significant concerns among the investment community. In contrast, the SEHK has 
a substantial proportion of blockholder-controlled companies with governance issues that 
are often similar to those that have recently confronted the LSE. Section D draws together 
our final observations and conclusions. 
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A. Examining the Enhanced Listing Regime within the UK Minority Shareholder 
Protection Framework 
The Framework for Minority Shareholder Protection in the UK 
Company law and securities regulation address different aspects of minority investor 
protection on listed markets. Minority shareholder protection regimes appear to be highly 
valued by investors, although work remains to be done in establishing their causal 
significance - whether in relation to corporate performance, investment portfolio 
performance, and at a broader level, market and economic development.8  
Although majority shareholder rule is widely seen as a legitimate basis for the exercise of 
power in the democracy of corporate capitalism, ‘the tyranny of the majority’ is a potential 
concern. Controlling shareholders are potentially able to expropriate resources from 
minority shareholders via a variety of mechanisms, most of which stem from their ability to 
control the appointment of the board of directors and pass resolutions at General Meetings.  
These mechanisms can, for example, take the form of appointing or rewarding senior 
managers on the basis of family rather than meritocratic considerations or influencing 
company strategy in a way that promotes blockholders’ personal idiosyncratic objectives. 
More egregiously, the controlling shareholder can use their position of influence to facilitate 
related party transactions, asset stripping or outright theft from the company. These 
‘private benefits of control’ are generally achieved at the expense of the net wealth of 
minority shareholders, and allow blockholders to benefit disproportionately from their 
control of a majority (or significant minority) of the voting shares of the entity.9 
In the UK, minority shareholder protection had humble beginnings10 in company law. Even 
today, the disadvantage of being in the minority can only be countervailed by law to a 
modest extent. Minority shareholder protection became more developed in the 1980s,11 
with the rise of securities regulation.12 Corporate transparency is a key objective of 
securities regulation and continued to be emphasised in the 1990s, although minority 
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interests were also promoted via more prescriptive corporate governance standards.13 
Securities regulation took off as part of European legal harmonisation in the 2000s,14 further 
advancing corporate transparency and anti-market abuse as measures of investor 
protection.  
In mapping out the landscape for minority shareholder protection in the UK, Chiu15  has 
argued that minority shareholder remedies based on company law rights, such as the 
derivative action and unfair prejudice petition, are framed in such a way that can rarely be 
used by minority shareholders in the capital markets.16 More substantive minority 
shareholder protection is increasingly found in securities regulation. However, corporate 
transparency promoted by securities regulation only supports minority shareholder 
protection in the sense of informing shareholder trading and exit strategies. In the UK, it 
does not adequately offer significant opportunities for investor power to be exercised 
through private securities litigation. Hence, minority protection based on securities litigation 
can largely been seen as ‘law in the books’ but not in action due to procedural barriers in 
civil justice and the collective action problem.17  
However, as part of a ‘soft law’ component  of securities regulation, the UK Listing Rules 
have, since the 1990s, maintained a requirement that listed companies in the highest listing 
category of the LSE should comply with the provisions of the prevailing Code of Corporate 
Governance or else explain any deviations. The Code describes best practices in corporate 
governance – particularly in relation to the structure, composition and functioning of the 
board of directors and its committees. Adherence to the Code is intended to provide 
minority investors with an adequate ex ante level of protection through the mechanism of 
an effective board which takes account of the interests of all shareholders (including 
minority interests) in the direction of the company. The current UK Code has evolved since 
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the first Cadbury Code of Corporate Governance and is often seen as a leading standard18 in 
the advancement of the ‘soft law’ approach to corporate governance. Premium-listed 
companies19 are subject to it on a comply-or-explain basis, meaning that companies are 
urged to comply, but are free to provide explanations in their annual reports if they deviate 
from the Code’s provisions (although they must always comply with its principles). 
The Corporate Governance Code has a quasi-mandatory character as part of the securities 
regulation framework. The obligation to comply or explain means that the Code is not – 
contrary to popular perceptions – an entirely voluntary or self-regulatory mechanism; 
Premium-listed companies have no choice but to engage with the Code. Nonetheless, it 
reflects an investment culture that is ‘negotiated’20- bottom-up and dialogic in nature. The 
Code maintains a delicate balance in soft law between increasingly prescriptive corporate 
governance standards preferred by the buy-side21 and support for flexibility in governance 
policies22 favoured by the issuer community. 
Minority shareholders in the UK have come to regard shareholder engagement on the basis 
of the Code and substantial compliance with the Code’s main provisions as a key form of 
minority shareholder protection.23 In other words, in the absence of ‘law in action’ in the 
regimes of company law and private securities litigation, there is a marked trend in favour of 
corporate governance standards and company-shareholder engagement 24 as the key means 
of realising minority shareholder protection in UK listed markets. Minority shareholders 
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therefore view the exercise of ‘voice’ as an important means of protection,25 although the 
institutional community has tended to rely more on issuer compliance with the Code than 
engagement.26 There is a danger that minority shareholders find superficial comfort in a 
form of compliance that is based on box-ticking.  
Minority exercise of voice may be through voting at General Meetings, levels of which have 
improved over the years27 or through informal engagement supported by the UK 
Stewardship Code, introduced in 2010.28 In practice, shareholder engagement is motivated 
by a range of different interests and minority shareholders do not consistently avail 
themselves of it.29 However, the framework for engagement can be seen as viable and 
attractive to investors. A key issue underpinning the introduction of the Enhanced Listing 
Regime was uncertainty about whether the soft law nature of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code was sufficient to protect minority shareholder interests in the unfamiliar context of 
blockholder-controlled companies.  
The Enhanced Listing Regime and Minority Shareholder Protection  
The LSE has historically attracted listings from all over the world, particularly in the period 
since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, which reduced the attractiveness of 
US capital markets to some foreign issuers.30 In April 2010, the UK Listing Authority (which 
was the Financial Services Authority but is now the Financial Conduct Authority) introduced 
                                                          
25
 Albert O. Hirschman, ‘Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Vol. 
25. Harvard University Press, 1970. 
26
 Marc Moore, ‘Whispering Sweet Nothings: The Limitations of Informal Conformance in UK Corporate 
Governance' (2009) 9 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 77-120. 
27
 Paul Hewitt, ‘The Exercise of Shareholder Rights’ (2011) at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg54d0l1lvf-en. 
28
 which provides a set of best practices for institutional shareholder engagement. Recommended in David 
Walker, Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Financial Institutions (Final, 26 Nov 2009) at 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/walker_review_information.htm.  See Iris H-Y Chiu, ‘Turning Institutional 
Investors into “Stewards”- Exploring the Meaning and Objectives of “Stewardship”’ (2013) Current Legal 
Problems 1 for an analysis of the Code, and some initial evaluation of the Code in Simon CY Wong, “Why 
Stewardship is Proving Elusive to Institutional shareholders” (2010) Butterworths Journal of Banking and 
Financial Law 406. 
29
 Financial Reporting Council, Developments in  Corporate Governance 2013 The impact and implementation 
of the UK  Corporate Governance and Stewardship Codes (Dec 2013) at 21ff. 
30
 Peter Hostak, Thomas Lys, Yong George Yang, and Emre Carr, ‘An Examination of the Impact of the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act on the Attractiveness of U.S. Capital Markets For Foreign Firms’, (2013) 18 Review of 
Accounting Studies 522-559. 
the Premium/Standard listing categories31 in order to bind most of the LSE’s listed 
companies to the UK’s brand of corporate governance standards.  
Following the introduction of the new regime, most of the LSE’s Primary listed companies 
shifted to the Premium category where they are required to comply with the provisions of 
the UK Corporate Governance Code or else explain any deviations. 32 EU passported listed 
companies are no longer allowed to merely adhere to harmonised EU legislation which does 
not impose such a requirement. Non-EU companies listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) are able to become Premium listed companies and are subject to the corporate 
governance standards in the Code. This is potentially appealing to global companies as the 
branding of the Premium listing allows them to signal their adherence to the most stringent 
standards of UK corporate governance. 
As of 30 April 2014, the total number of companies listed on the LSE was 1,30433 with about 
a third (427) of companies incorporated outside of the UK. The development of corporate 
governance standards in the UK has occurred in the context of a dispersed ownership model. 
However, foreign companies that are Premium listed on the LSE are also required to adhere 
to the UK standards even if they have a different ownership structure i.e. a concentrated 
ownership model.  
A number of large foreign Premium listed companies have recently been embroiled in 
governance controversies which arguably reflect the less desirable features of concentrated 
ownership. These widely-publicised cases have created new uncertainties for UK investors 
and regulators, both of which have traditionally focused on agency type problems arising in 
a dispersed ownership system.34 This has prompted a key question about the functioning of 
the UK listing regime. Is the widely-praised UK corporate governance framework which has 
been developed to deal with principal-agent type governance problems – and applied by 
means of soft law - also adequate for dealing with issues arising from the principal-principal 
conflicts that can emerge in firms with concentrated ownership?35 We now describe the 
three main cases that have thrown this hypothesis into doubt. 
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In 2011, Bumi plc, which evolved from a Jersey incorporated investment vehicle (Valar plc) 
founded by Nathaniel Rothschild was floated on the LSE. Valar Plc was originally a cash shell, 
attracting investment from institutional investors largely on the basis of the reputation of 
Rothschild and his business partners, and only afterwards became engaged in mining 
activities after Rothschild decided to invest the company’s assets in two Indonesian mining 
companies. Bumi plc was block-held, featuring two Indonesian companies that in 
combination owned the majority stake. Rothschild, who owned a minority stake of about 
7%, then fell out with his co-shareholders, the influential Bakrie family of Indonesia, over 
allegations of misappropriation of moneys by the latter of up to £1bn and financial 
statement misrepresentations.36  
The Bakrie family then tried to remove Rothschild from the Board and dilute his stake, but 
Rothschild alleged abuse of minority rights and unsuccessfully attempted a coup to seize 
control of the Board. Ultimately, in early 2013, in the face of highly critical scrutiny from the 
UK media and a plummeting share price (to around one-fifth of its IPO valuation), the Bakrie 
family agreed to sell their stake to an Indonesian businessman (Samin Tan) who remained 
on the Board and as a long term shareholder. The split from the Bakrie family entailed the 
renaming of Bumi plc to Asia Mineral Resources37, although its main asset remained a coal 
miner, the fifth largest company in Indonesia. 
Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation (ENRC)38 was another blockholder-controlled firm 
entangled in governance problems. It was founded in Kazakhstan in 1994 and co-owned by 
three oligarchs (Alexander Mashkevitch, Patokh Chodiev and Alijan Ibragimov), a Kazakh 
company (Kazakhmys) and the Kazakh state. ENRC focused on natural resources mining 
including iron ore, aluminium, coal, copper and cobalt. ENRC was headquartered in London 
and subsequently listed on the LSE in 2006. Amidst boardroom rows surrounding the 
controversial purchase of a mining concession in the Democratic Republic of Congo, two of 
its independent directors, Sir Richard Sykes and Ken Olisa, were voted off the Board by the 
majority shareholders at the 2011 AGM. Two further non-executive directors stepped down 
at the same time. Following an inconclusive investigation by an external law firm, the 
Serious Fraud Office in the UK commenced investigations into allegations of corruption, 
fraud and bribery at ENRC in April 2013. Not surprisingly, each of these developments was 
associated with significant declines in the share price.  
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In the face of unrelenting public exposure and criticism39, ENRC decided to take the 
company private and proposed to buy out the 18% free float of shares on the LSE. The 
buyout offer was criticised by independent board members to be at a significant undervalue. 
However in August 2013, most of the minority shareholders had accepted the offer which 
was worth only about 45% of the original float price. The company then delisted from the 
LSE on 28 October 2013.  
Another unfortunate episode unfolded in early 2014 at Essar Energy,40 an Indian resources 
company listed on the LSE in April 2010. The company was 78% controlled by an investment 
vehicle owned by Indian billionaires, the Ruia family. Essar began to suffer major losses for a 
variety of reasons, including a high debt burden and setbacks in energy permit negotiations 
with the Indian Government.41 The share price lost almost 75% of its IPO valuation, at which 
point the blockholder decided to take the company private. The minority shareholders were 
made a buyout offer at the prevailing low market valuation. Both the minority shareholders, 
which included UK institutions and insurance companies, and a special committee of Essar 
Energy’s own independent directors criticised the opportunistic buyout offer and appealed 
to the blockholder to respect the interests of minority shareholders as well as those of the 
majority. However, in the face of an uncompromising attitude from the blockholder, both 
saw little choice other than to accept in view of imminent delisting.42  
The experiences of Bumi, ENRC and Essar Energy highlighted to investors that minority 
expropriation43 and lack of external accountability are side effects that may be associated 
with the concentrated ownership model. The sheer unfamiliarity of the UK equity market 
with blockholder-controlled entities also added to a widespread public perception that 
concentrated ownership was synonymous with ‘weak’ governance. However, it is by no 
means obvious from empirical studies that concentrated ownership , per se, is 
systematically associated with inferior corporate performance.44 Many commentators have 
convincingly argued the blockholder model may, in the right institutional context, promote 
                                                          
39
 One of the ejected directors, Ken Olisa, famously described the culture at ENRC as “more Soviet than City”. 
‘ENRC “Soviet-style” control accusation denied’, Financial Times (14 June 2011). 
40
 See ‘Essar Energy Bid Turns Hostile’, Financial Times (14 March 2014). 
41
 ‘Reversal of fortunes for India takes toll on Essar Energy’, Financial Times (18 February 2014) 
42
 ‘Essar Energy panel backs Ruia family’s take-private offer’, Financial Times (13 May 2014). 
43
 For example Brown v. British Abrasive Wheel Co [1919] 1 Ch 290; Dafen Tinplate Co Ltd. v Llanelli Steel Co 
[1920] 2 Ch 124. 
44
 Steen Thomsen and Torben Pedersen, ‘Ownership Structure and Economic Performance in the Largest 
European Companies’ (2000) 21 Strat. Mgmt. J. 689–705. 
positive governance values such as better agency monitoring,45 long-termism and shielding 
from capital market pressures that may allow companies to focus on research, investment 
and long-term growth and sustainability.46  
Nonetheless, the UK Listing Authority, in the light of adverse media coverage and pressure 
from institutional investors, felt compelled to respond to the negative episodes with the 
introduction of a new set of listing rules47 to boost minority shareholder protection in 
blockholder-controlled companies. The resulting Enhanced Listing Regime seeks to protect 
minority shareholders by ‘ensuring the voice of minority shareholders is heard when the 
behaviour of a controlling shareholder is not appropriate’.48 Following two rounds of 
consultation,49 the reforms came into force on 16 May 2014.50  
We are of the view that the Enhanced Listing Regime is in spirit a defensive measure to 
protect the reputational brand of the UK listing regime as perceived by institutional 
investors. It may also reflect an underlying fear that the UK Corporate Governance Code is 
not necessarily well positioned to deal with blockholder-related governance issues. Its 
model of voice facilitation has been developed in the context of dispersed ownership where 
it seeks to promote dialogue and negotiation between companies and external shareholders. 
However, in a blockholder-controlled company, major shareholders are in a position to 
directly impose their governance preferences. Although any non-compliance with the Code 
must still be explained to the market, there is much less scope to force such companies to 
engage with those minority shareholders that are not supportive of the chosen governance 
framework. The Code is hence potentially a much less effective ex ante minority protection 
mechanism in blockholder-controlled companies. 
We do not perceive, however, that the episodes discussed above have significantly 
tarnished the more general brand of the UK Corporate Governance Code. The Enhanced 
Listing Regime is framed separately from the Code and focused on a relatively small 
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segment of the listed market. This demarcated approach permits regulators to avoid 
confronting the wider question of whether soft law is adequate for promoting good 
governance across the market as a whole. Nonetheless, we speculate that increased 
prescription in corporate governance is a developing trend which is already making a major 
impact on financial sector governance51. Over time, the Enhanced Listing Regime may come 
to be seen as part of a wider trend towards more binding and prescriptive corporate 
governance standards in UK listed equity.52 
We nevertheless raise doubts as to whether the Enhanced Listing Regime adequately deals 
with some specific governance issues that have emerged in blockholder-controlled issuers. 
Furthermore, we are concerned that this new regime may be underpinned by a lack of 
insight into the more positive aspects of blockholder ownership revealed in various other 
successful economies.53  
The first key component of the Enhanced Listing Regime is that, if a Premium-listed 
company has a controlling shareholder,54 the controlling shareholder must enter into a 
mandatory agreement55 with the company. This agreement is intended to regulate the 
blockholder’s influence over the company, ensure that the company’s constitution does not 
undermine the position of minority shareholders and preserves the ‘independence’ of the 
business. The aim is to limit the extent of private benefit that can be extracted by 
controlling shareholders as well as mitigate the lack of accountability to minority 
shareholders.  
Business ‘independence’ is defined in broad terms, meaning that the company is not overly 
reliant on conducting business with the controlling shareholder or on access to the 
controlling shareholder for financing. The business must have strategic control over its 
assets, business strategy and ability to earn revenue. Independence from the controlling 
shareholder means that all commercial transactions and arrangements conducted with the 
controlling shareholder have to be at arm’s length and on normal commercial terms. The 
                                                          
51
 Roger M. Barker, ‘The New Governance of UK Finance: Implementing the Walker Review.’  Butterworths 
Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, May 2010. See also Article 88 of Directive 2013/36/EU on 
access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment 
firms (CRD IV). 
52
 The nature of corporate governance standards reflects the strength of minority shareholder protection 
regimes and the issue of whether such standards should be regarded as ‘law’ or ‘soft law’ could be of great 
practical importance. 
53
 e.g. in continental Europe and many fast growing Asian markets. 
54
 defined as a shareholder with control of at least 30% of the voting shares. 
55
 Listing Rules 6.1.4ff. It is not necessary that every controlling shareholder enters into a separate agreement. 
controlling shareholder must also agree to not to take any step that would circumvent the 
Listing Rules.  
If a Premium-listed company fails to put in place a mandatory agreement, or fails to comply 
with the independence terms, or if an independent director on the Board is of the view that 
the agreement is not complied with, then minority independent shareholders are given 
extra monitoring powers to veto all related-party transactions.56 However, the threat of 
delisting is not used as an enforcement mechanism – otherwise minority independent 
shareholders would be further punished by being cut off from any ability to sell their equity 
stake. 
A second key aspect of the Enhanced Listing Regime introduces a re-ordering of voting 
rights under certain circumstances. This aims to give more weight to minority shareholders’ 
voice than would ordinarily be the case in the General Meeting. In particular, independent 
minority shareholders are provided with additional voice when appointing independent 
directors or when a cancellation of the Premium listing is proposed.  Their approval by 
majority is sought as a class instead of being subsumed under the General Meeting, 
although in the case of electing independent directors, a protest vote of independent 
shareholders can only temporarily delay the majority decision for a period of 90 days.  
An earlier proposal to compel boards of blockholder-controlled companies to appoint a 
majority of independent directors was ultimately dropped from the final rules. The Listing 
Authority was persuaded to refrain from over-prescription on boardroom composition at 
the behest of the UK issuer community, although there was significant buy-side support for 
the introduction of a mandatory requirement for a majority of independent directors.57 We 
now proceed to a more detailed analysis of the key measures.  
Re-ordering Voting Powers in Favour of the Minority and Consistency with Company Law 
As described above, the Enhanced Listing Regime requires approval of minority independent 
shareholders voting as a class in two situations: election of independent directors and 
where a cancellation of the Premium listing is sought.  
The former is particularly important to minority shareholders.  Independent directors are 
potentially well-placed to address some of the main governance problems that have arisen 
in blockholder-controlled issuers, such as lack of external transparency, abuse of related-
party transactions, weaknesses in internal control systems and non-compliance with anti-
corruption and bribery legislation. The privileged position of independent directors as 
company ‘insiders’, with influence over decision-making, can potentially act as a significant 
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check on the blockholder’s power. Minority shareholders therefore have a strong interest in 
securing the appointment of robust and capable independent directors to the board.  
Can such re-ordering of voting rights be supported in company law? The company law 
framework regulates the exercise of majority power in general meetings subject to the 
standard of ‘reasonable hypothetical shareholder acting bona fides in the interest of the 
company as a whole’.58 Case law jurisprudence recognises that where a majority stake exists, 
the exercise of such powers could be adverse to the minority’s interests, particularly in the 
context of constitutional amendments. However, courts have refrained from interfering 
excessively with voting powers exercised at general meetings.59 In Australia, courts can 
prevent the successful exercise of majority power if unfairly oppressive consequences result 
for minority shareholders.60 Such position has not been followed in the UK.61 The policy 
position in the UK, at least before the passage of the Companies Act 2006, seemed to be 
reluctant to upset the private proprietary rights attached to shareholdings. 
It could be argued that UK courts have largely upheld the power of the majority vote 
because there are specific minority shareholder remedies in company law,62 which render it 
inappropriate for courts to achieve minority protection through a tampering with the 
exercise of voting powers. But the unfair prejudice petition for minority shareholders63 is 
rarely utilised in the context of listed companies as judicial interpretation of ‘unfair 
prejudice’ has made its application much more pertinent to closely-held private 
companies.64 Further, derivative litigation has been rare65  and is unlikely to be easily 
utilised given the procedural barriers in the legal framework.66  
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Given that one of the most attractive features in UK minority shareholder protection is 
respect for minority shareholder voice, the re-ordering of voting rights in the Enhanced 
Listing Regime can be viewed as broadly consistent with the facilitative nature of company 
law. Although the Regime prima facie distorts the balance of voting power in the general 
meeting, the over-weighting of minority voting rights in specified circumstances is arguably 
necessary to provide them with the capacity to exercise their voice and participatory rights 
under company law. 67 
Further, legislative tinkering with voting powers is not new. Section 239 of the Companies 
Act 2006 provides that ratification of directors’ breaches of duty can be achieved by a 
majority vote in the general meeting, provided that interested shareholders’ votes are 
ignored. This form of legislative intrusion under-weights the voting power of the relevant 
shareholder but preserves the integrity of the ratification process. Such re-ordering of 
voting rights also achieves the internalisation of companies’ management affairs and 
minimises the externalisation of irregularities onto public arenas such as courts. One could 
view the Enhanced Listing Regime in a similar way, i.e. providing a facilitative framework for 
minority voice to be heard.  
Mukwiri and Siems68 have argued for caution in protecting minority shareholders by 
increases in voting power, for fear of the adverse incentives such changes in power 
dynamics may introduce for management bodies. They advocate protection of minority 
shareholders without resorting to increases in voting power, such as through greater 
transparency.  
For example, a ‘middle way’ of enhancing shareholder voice without tinkering with voting 
powers could be achieved by empowering minority shareholders to request more 
information. Information request rights could further be supported by a right to obtain an 
injunction against proceeding with a course of action still subject to explanation to minority 
shareholders, similar to the kind of injunction a shareholder may obtain to restrain directors 
from constitutional breaches.69 However, ‘middle way’ rights designed to enhance minority 
voice may be regarded as weak because abusive behaviour may not be prevented although 
it could subsequently be discovered.  Besides, the ethos of facilitating shareholder voice 
would support ex ante rights such as the re-ordering of voting rights instead of relying on ex 
post remedies. 
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In relation to enhancing minority voting power where a cancellation of the Premium listing 
is concerned, we are of the view that the Enhanced Listing Regime does not adequately 
address the problem of disadvantageous minority buyouts. On the face of it, the new rules 
allow minority shareholders to block any proposal to cancel a Premium listing. Their 
approval needs to be sought as a class, and the general meeting must on the whole approve 
the cancellation by a special majority of 75%. However, the majority vote of minority 
independent shareholders can be dispensed with in a takeover situation if another 
corporate entity succeeds in acquiring 80% of the voting power or more.70  
This technique was utilised to de-list Essar Energy from the LSE in June 2014.71 The 
controlling family already owned 78% of Essar Energy. The family used an unlisted corporate 
entity under their control72 to launch a hostile takeover for Essar Energy and acquire 
another 2% from minority shareholders. At that point, the Board of Essar Energy – including 
its independent directors - conceded that the threshold had been passed for the controlling 
blockholders to delist and reluctantly recommended that remaining minority shareholders 
should accept the buyout offer.  
Essar Energy’s success in buying out the minority shareholders was also due in part to the 
low free float of the company’s shares – at the time of its IPO, Essar obtained a waiver in 
respect of the normal minimum 25% free float requirement (on the basis that the market 
liquidity of the shares was sufficiently high).  Although we agree that significantly raising the 
minimum free float requirement, an option mooted at consultation but rejected by the 
FCA73, would have been an undesirable way of protecting minority voice, regulators would 
be well advised to ensure that waivers from existing free float requirements are applied only 
sparingly in the future. 
Mandatory Agreement and Consistency with Corporate Governance Standards 
The Mandatory Relationship Agreement 74 (MRA) required by the Enhanced Listing Regime 
is a measure that seeks to pre-commit controlling shareholders to the ‘independence’ of the 
business and the importance of minority voice. As a key minority fear lies in the risks of 
tunnelling and misappropriations by the controlling block-holder, it can be argued that the 
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mandatory independence provisions in the MRA will keep related-party transactions and 
arrangements under check. The MRA is principally monitored by independent directors, 
whose signalling of non-compliance will trigger minority veto rights to related-party 
transactions, however small. 
We raise several concerns with respect to this new measure. A first is that such 
independence provisions could ultimately limit the benefits that a controlling blockholder 
brings to the company albeit mitigating some of the risks.  
Corporate governance standards in the UK have been developed with the primary objective 
of overseeing and controlling the undue personal agendas that corporate management may 
pursue. Hence the structures of independent directors, board committees and shareholder 
engagement have been institutionalised to monitor those in control. The MRA is introduced 
within the same ethos in relation to preserving the independence of the business, in this 
case with respect to controlling shareholders rather than management. 
However, the nature of the blockholder’s influence over a company is arguably different 
from that of a CEO or top manager. The blockholder’s stake in a company will generally 
comprise of a larger personal financial commitment, a firm-specific stake in terms of skills 
and innovation and possibly an emotional stake based on founding, family or other personal 
attachment. These factors may play a powerful role in aligning the blockholder’s motivation 
with the long-term success of the company.75   In contrast, the professional manager’s stake 
is likely to be largely financial and more short-term. Academic literature points to the 
difficulties in designing executive remuneration to motivate towards long term 
performance.76  
The nature of the founding block-holder/controller’s relationship to a company was 
emphasized by Ken Moelis in a recent high profile market listing. The Moelis IPO77 
highlighted the founder shareholder’s fears that minority activist shareholders such as 
hedge funds could divert the attention of the company for short termist purposes and 
disrupt the blockholder’s long term vision.  
The MRA’s framework for preserving the independence of the business may introduce 
disincentives for blockholder commitment to the company. It is legitimate to ask if the MRA 
is a necessary measure in order to resolve welfare-destroying conflicts between 
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shareholders or if it is merely acceding to the special interests of institutional investors with 
negative implications for the success of the company as a whole.  
A second possible concern is that the MRA is an agreement entered into between 
controlling shareholders (defined widely and including associates of controlling shareholders) 
and the company. Minority shareholders are not privy to those agreements. The MRA is 
neither strictly speaking a constitutional document as it does not bind all members of the 
company, neither is it a private shareholders’ agreement. There is a need to critically 
analyse the nature of the MRA and its implications for minority shareholder protection. 
As minority independent shareholders are not privy to the MRA, they do not have a right to 
enforce it. In fact there would appear to represent a lacuna in enforcement as the company 
in such a scenario would be in the hands of the blockholder. Further, minority shareholders 
may not be able to take derivative actions against the blockholder as a breach of the MRA 
may not be regarded as a breach of directors’ duties.78  
The Enhanced Listing Regime addresses these problems by increasing monitoring rights for 
minority shareholders in blockholder-controlled companies. It empowers them to veto any 
related-party transactions in the event of a breach. Such a breach would invariably be 
determined by independent directors, as the opinion of an independent director, even if 
contrary to the Board, would trigger the minority veto rights. Hence, it is arguable that the 
agreement between the controlling blockholder and company would in fact be ‘enforced’ by 
minority independent shareholders on behalf of the company. This puts minority 
independent shareholders in a representative capacity for the company.  
One wonders if acting in a representative capacity for the company may trigger fiduciary 
duties owed to the company in the specific context of preserving the independence of the 
business. Can the preservation of the independence of the business be equivalent to the 
wider duty under section 172 to promote the long term success of the company for the 
benefit of all members as a whole? Could the actions of the minority independent 
shareholders be subject to judicial scrutiny and claims by the blockholders? It may be 
argued that where minority veto rights are triggered under the MRA, they are not exercised 
as a matter of minority voice but as representative voice in the company’s interests. It is 
important to consider the implications for minority shareholders in terms of obligations if 
such rights are triggered. 
Further, where independent directors determine a breach, there seems to be no further 
option for internal remediation. Minority veto rights are triggered right away. This would 
accord with the above observations that minority independent shareholders are acting in a 
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representative capacity, as required by the Enhanced Listing Regime, to preserve the 
independence of the business, and not in a personal capacity. Could a non-severe breach of 
the independence requirement be dealt with by ratification by minority independent 
shareholders instead? This would minimise the polarisation of positions in the general 
meeting and would facilitate dialogue. Structuring the MRA in such a way as to leave out 
minority shareholders as party may not be optimal and conducive to realising minority voice. 
If minority shareholders are included in the MRA, then the MRA would likely become a 
constitutional document, falling within the definition of an agreement under section 29(d) 
of the Companies Act, arguably forming part of the company’s constitution. Constitutional 
status would boost the rights and voice of minority independent shareholders as 
enforcement of the MRA could be carried out as personal rights79 or under the unfair 
prejudice petition. If so, it is possible to view the MRA as providing superior protection for 
minority shareholders where there is a controlling blockholder as compared to companies 
without a controlling blockholder. The Listing Rules would be providing safeguards in 
‘business independence’ for minority shareholders in a block-held company, while minority 
shareholders facing other agency problems in widely-held companies are not provided with 
specific protection in terms of business conduct. Such constitutional status could boost the 
rights of minority independent shareholders to the point of over-correction.  
The MRA’s ambivalent nature may reflect its experimental and tentative position on special 
minority protection in block-held companies. It is a suis generis document that neither falls 
within the ambit of the company’s constitution nor the contractual framework relating to 
shareholders’ agreements (which could make the Listing Authority seem as if a framework 
has been put in place a framework to facilitate direct showdowns between controlling 
blockholders and minority independent shareholders). So we remain uncertain if minority 
protection is the exercise of a personal right or a representative right, the former being a 
more powerful tool whether it is constitutionally or contractually based. The latter 
interpretation may result in more burdens being imposed on minority independent 
shareholders. The uncertainties surrounding the obligations of independent directors and 
minority independent shareholders in enforcing the MRA could result in the cosmetic 
implementation of the MRA and a lack of enforcement.  
A final concern is that the introduction of the MRA may generate the perception that the UK 
views blockholder-controlled companies negatively and this could make the LSE less 
attractive to international issuers. In March 2014, Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group (JLT) 
became the first Premium listed company to seek the Listing Authority’s permission to 
downgrade to a Standard Listing in anticipation of avoiding the Enhanced Listing Regime.80 
JLT is block-held by 5 companies controlled and owned largely by the Jardine family based in 
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Hong Kong, and has always had a history of insisting upon insider control and resisting 
compliance with best practices in corporate governance such as having independent 
directors on the Board. The Jardine Group is however well-known for taking a long term 
view over a range of carefully selected diversified businesses and has delivered consistent 
returns to minority investors.81  
The JLT move can be viewed as suis generis. The Jardine Group has always jealously guarded 
its insider control, to the extent that it delisted 4 of its companies from the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange in 1994 and relisted in Singapore due to a breakdown in its negotiations with the 
Securities and Futures Commission, to be exempt from the takeover regime in Hong Kong.82 
It remains to be seen whether JLT’s actions are representative of wider market sentiment. 
 
B. Minority Shareholder Protection in the US Listing Regime 
This Section will focus on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as the premier listing 
destination in the US. Although the trio of the NYSE, Nasdaq and American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) dominate the listed market in the US, the NYSE’s historical significance and 
reputational standing makes it an apt comparative subject for the LSE. In 2012, it was 
recorded that 80% of Fortune 500 companies were NYSE-listed companies.83 
Since Berle and Means’s seminal study in the 1930s,84 it has been widely assumed that most 
public companies in the US enjoy dispersed ownership. As a result, the key corporate 
governance questions are seen as revolving around the agency problems85 arising from the 
separation of ownership from control. However, Holderness observes that there is an 
overwhelming majority of listed firms in the US with a blockholder of at least 5%,86 and 
Demott points out that 30% of Fortune 500 firms feature concentrated ownership, including 
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in US companies.87 Hence, block-held structures are common even in a jurisdiction that is 
often assumed to have attained widely-held democratic capitalism.88  
However, if blockholding is defined as controlling at least a 20% voting stake, La Porta et al89 
document that only 20% of large U.S. firms have blockholder-dominated ownership. It 
seems that although blockholders are common in the US economy, they tend to lack control 
rights.90 This leads Cheffins and Bank to conclude that “a separation between ownership 
and control remains an appropriate reference point for those seeking to come to terms with 
the historical development of U.S. corporate governance and current arrangements in 
public corporations”.91 
The main blockholders in US listed companies are founders,92 families93 and managers and 
employees.94  In particular, there is a growing trend for founders of Silicon Valley technology 
companies to retain control through a dual-class share structure in which voting rights 
exceed cash flow rights. Founder shareholders may be motivated to insist on such voting 
structures due to concerns about the potential risk of short-termism in widely-held 
corporations. For example, Google’s founder shareholders Larry Page and Sergey Brin have 
retained significant control of 55.7% after the initial public offer of shares despite having 
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only 15% of the cash flow rights.95 They cite their long-term perspective as rationale for 
supporting the issue of a class of non-voting shares, which controversially started trading in 
April 2014.96 Empirical research indicates that dual-class voting structures can reduce trust 
in companies and may be avoided by some investors.97 Gompers et al also find that listed 
companies with dual-class structures have by and large performed worse over the long term 
than those without a controlling shareholder.98 However, successful companies such as 
Berkshire Hathaway, News Corp, Google, Facebook, Amazon and a host of other internet-
based companies such as LinkedIn, Zynga, Groupon and JD.com and Alibaba.com from China 
continue to attract investors who wish to share in the upside of successful companies led by 
talented founders (despite their apparently weak position as minority shareholders). 
The legal frameworks for minority shareholder protection in the US are fragmented. 
Company law remains the province of state law and hence shareholder rights are 
determined by state law frameworks.99 Most academics100 have agreed that the state of 
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Delaware has emerged as the winner for incorporations in the US. However, the forces of 
regulatory competition have shaped the Delaware company law regime into one that is pro-
management in nature.101 Directors are largely protected by a business judgment rule102 
that impedes judicial scrutiny of conduct that involves business judgment unless there is a 
breach of fiduciary duty.103 Shareholder derivative suits are rarely likely to succeed.104 
Further, shareholder rights are rather limited.105 Bebchuk106 points out that, compared to 
their UK counterparts, shareholders in Delaware-incorporated companies do not have the 
right to propose Charter amendments and are excluded from game-ending and corporate 
restructuring decisions. Further, Delaware upholds the right of management to defend 
vigorously against takeovers by means of poison pills so that the market for corporate 
control is muted in its disciplinary effect upon management.107 
Despite this context, Gelter108 points out that shareholder primacy109 is paradoxically the 
dominant rhetoric in corporate law and management ideology. Shareholder primacy is 
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famously embodied in Friedman’s claim that the social responsibility of a corporation is to 
make profits for its shareholders, and shareholder wealth maximisation is the overriding 
corporate objective.  
The weaknesses of Delaware company law from a minority shareholder perspective have 
been compensated for in other quarters: highly respected listing standards maintained by 
the NYSE to protect minority shareholders since even before the Securities Exchange Act 
1934 and the advent of securities regulation in the 1930s. Seligman110 provides an account 
of the NYSE’s historical role in ‘maintaining appropriate standards of corporate 
responsibility, integrity and accountability’ to shareholders’ in relation to its listed 
companies. Following the controversial listing of non-voting shares by Dodge Brothers Inc 
and Industrial Rayon Corporation on the NYSE, the NYSE decided in 1926 to disallow the 
listing of non-voting shares or shares with unusual voting provisions, effectively upholding a 
one-share one-vote principle.111 This policy established the early reputation of the NYSE as a 
strong advocate of minority rights. 
However, in 1985, the NYSE decided to relax its adherence to the one-share one-vote 
principle by admitting a number of exceptions.112 This softening stance occurred due to 
competitive pressures from the NASD and AMEX, both of which allowed dual-class voting 
structures subject to corporate governance safeguards.113  
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 NASD required that the listed company appoint at least two independent directors and that an independent 
audit committee had to be formed; AMEX required that shareholders be allowed to appoint at least two 
directors to the Board within 2 years of the dual-class listing. 
The relaxation of the one-share one –vote principle by the NYSE was attacked as a 
retrograde step in several academic quarters114. However, other commentators have 
defended115 it and the NYSE has since maintained its relaxation of the one-share one-vote 
principle. Following their demutalisation and for-profit orientation since 2006, one should 
be mindful of the scepticism voiced by Karmel116 regarding the role of exchanges in watering 
down governance requirements in order to attract potential issuers. However, exchanges 
should not assume all of the responsibility for the current state of the minority protection 
regime.  They are subject to the intervention of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in 
respect of approving, amending or adding to listing rules, to which we now turn.117  
The SEC was created in 1934 as part of the New Deal in response to an acute need for 
investor protection on securities markets.118 The main regulatory methodology adopted by 
the SEC was securities disclosure at initial public offers and in continuing obligations. La 
Porta el al have argued that SEC regulation and civil enforcement are central to the investor 
appeal of US securities markets.119 Further, Coffee opines that SEC enforcement is an 
attractive factor for investors who find comfort in the SEC-policed framework for investor 
protection.120 A number of commentators have also argued that the brand of stringent 
securities regulation in the US appeals to investors, motivating firms to cross-list on US stock 
exchanges if they wish to achieve bonding with those standards.121 Firms that bond with 
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such high investor-protection standards are likely to be rewarded with better market 
valuation and a broader investor base. However, a number of commentators also point out 
that the demand for cross-listings in the US could also primarily be due to the depth and 
liquidity of its capital markets.122  
In light of the weaknesses of state company law, securities regulation is arguably a major 
part of the minority shareholder protection landscape in the US. The viability of civil 
enforcement allows aggrieved investors to seek compensation for disclosure failings or 
market abuse such as insider dealing. A significant proportion of the minority shareholder 
protection available to investors in the US is realised through private securities litigation.123 
However, the SEC, perhaps influenced by the ever-louder voices of the institutional fund 
management industry,124 has increasingly extended its investor protection agenda to the 
provision of prescriptive corporate governance standards for listed companies,125 
particularly in terms of the structure and functioning of the board of directors.126  
In extending its reach into corporate governance, the SEC has faced controversy and 
challenge.127  Does the SEC have a broader mandate128 for investor protection which 
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justifies its adoption of prescriptive measures in corporate governance other than imposing 
disclosure obligations? The SEC is limited by the so-called ‘internal affairs doctrine’ which 
favours state company law when legislating on corporate governance matters.129 It suffered 
a major blow to its prescriptive competence in corporate governance in Business 
Roundtable v SEC in 1990130 when the DC Circuit struck down as invalid the SEC’s 
requirement forcing all exchanges to adopt a one-share one-vote rule. In 2011131 the DC 
Circuit invalidated the SEC’s  rule132 that allowed shareholders to place their nominee 
candidates to the Board on proxy materials prepared by the issuer. The Court in both 
instances held that the SEC had no jurisdiction to prescribe corporate governance standards 
that went beyond the empowering provisions in the Securities Exchange Act 1934 narrowly 
interpreted to relate only to disclosure obligations for investor protection. The contours of 
the SEC’s powers to prescribe corporate governance standards for investor protection are 
therefore uncertain.  
However, express legislation – often in the wake of corporate or financial crises - can still 
provide the SEC with power to prescribe corporate governance rules. For example, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002133 prescribes that national stock exchanges should put in place 
mandatory listing rules to require all listed companies to have in place an audit committee 
comprising only of independent directors to be responsible for hiring auditors,134 and that 
financial statements should be signed off by the Chief Executive and Financial Officers.135 
The Dodd-Frank Act 2010 provides for increased shareholder rights in an advisory vote 
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about executive compensation and golden parachutes,136 and prescribes that national 
exchanges should make mandatory listing rules to put in place claw-back policies regarding 
executive compensation.137 
Arguably, the SEC by virtue of the power to approve of, amend or add to stock exchange 
listing rules138 has influenced the corporate governance content of listing rules even when 
the SEC does not directly prescribe those standards.139 SEC influence has therefore become 
a surrogate channel for corporate governance standards to be set and maintained, 140 
although investors lack the options of civil enforcement which would be available if the 
standards were prescribed as SEC regulation. For example, the SEC’s reforms to Regulation 
S-K141  in 2007, introducing a host of corporate governance disclosures under Item 407142 
have been taken on board by the NYSE which incorporated the corporate governance 
standards in its listing rules in 2009.143  
The corporate governance standards maintained by the NYSE tend to be premised upon 
combating the agency problems arising from a potential misuse of power by professional 
management, and rely largely upon mandating a significant oversight and monitoring role 
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for independent board members.144 These independence requirements are possibly the 
most stringent in the world, at least compared to the other two listed markets studied in 
this article.  
However, several of the NYSE corporate governance standards do not apply if a listed 
company is block-held to 50% or more.145 These are: the requirement to have a majority of 
independent directors on the Board and to create nominating and compensation 
committees comprising only of independent directors. This is an interesting limitation of the 
reach of governance regulation. Perhaps the NYSE regards independent representation on 
the Board as being less relevant to blockholder-dominated enterprises? It is nonetheless a 
potential source of concern for minority shareholders in such companies.  
The NYSE Listing Rules do not provide many safeguards for minority shareholders of listed 
companies that feature dual-class voting or concentrated ownership. The Listing Rules 
contain general principles to prohibit conflicts of interest, misappropriation of corporate 
opportunities146 and director/officer share transactions surrounding corporate 
communications.147 Related-party transactions do not require shareholder voting except 
where they are issues of securities to the effect of increasing voting power by at least one 
per cent.148 These transactions may be effected after scrutiny by the audit committee.149 
The NYSE Listing Rules however attempt to ameliorate the disadvantage of holding non-
voting shares in a dual-class structure by prohibiting such shares from further being 
differentiated in terms of entitlements compared to the other classes of listed shares.150 
Further, the Listing rules spell out a number of protections for preferred shareholders. 
Preferred shareholders would have a right to nominate two directors if six defaults of 
dividend occur that are not compensated for.151 Preferred shareholders would also be able 
to vote as a class on new issues of the same security or if a more senior issue is proposed (in 
which case, a two-third majority is needed for approval).152 A two-thirds majority vote in the 
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preferred stock class is also required to pass any proposed charter or by-law amendments 
that affect the class.153 
Given the traditional US context of corporate resistance towards increasing shareholder 
rights,154 it is perhaps not surprising that the NYSE Listing Rules do not feature many specific 
shareholder protections, particularly in relation to companies with a dual-class voting 
structure. That said, empirical research155 in the US shows that many companies featuring 
dual-class voting structures have voluntarily put in place mechanisms such as increased 
independent Board representation to assuage minority concerns. Further, the concerns of 
minority shareholders may also be mitigated to an extent where the listed market is 
supported by a landscape of good security analyst coverage. 
In sum, securities regulation and its influence upon the corporate governance standards of 
stock exchange listing rules, along with associated investor litigation possibilities, lie at the 
core of the investor protection regime in the US. 156 However, specific standards that 
address governance issues in blockholder-controlled companies are relatively absent. 
Furthermore, the NYSE, Nasdaq and AMEX are distinctive in our global comparison of listing 
regimes in allowing dual-class voting structures which could in principle give rise to minority 
protection concerns. 157 What explains this regulatory status quo? We tentatively suggest 
that the pro-management perspective underlying legislative frameworks in company law, 
along with the continued prevalence of dispersed ownership in most listed companies, 
continues to incline investors and regulators towards a focus on the agency problem of 
over-powerful management, and not towards issues that pertain to the governance of 
blockholder-controlled companies. Furthermore, the unparalleled commercial success of 
leading US technology companies, despite (or perhaps because of) their unconventional 
governance structures, has legitimised a shift away from a regulatory regime that protects 
minority shareholders in the blockholder context. 
 
C. Minority Shareholder Protection in the Hong Kong Listing Regime 
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The primary market for listings in Hong Kong is the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK), 
wholly owned by the listed parent company Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd (HKEx). 
The SEHK is the second largest market by capitalisation in Asia after the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange.  
The SEHK is dominated by blockholder-controlled firms. Domestically incorporated block-
held firms listed on the SEHK are mainly family owned and controlled.158 The SEHK is also a 
favourite listing destination for Chinese companies. Many Chinese-incorporated block-held 
firms are state-owned and controlled, issuing ‘H’ shares on the SEHK,159 including the Bank 
of China, PetroChina and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. Chinese companies 
can also be incorporated in Hong Kong or elsewhere and list as ‘red chips’160 on the SEHK 
while maintaining their businesses largely in China. Two examples of the latter are China 
Mobile Ltd and Lenovo Group Ltd, both incorporated in Hong Kong.  
Commentators have discussed extensively the issue of minority expropriation by controlling 
shareholders in Hong Kong. Prior to its criminalisation in 2003, controlling shareholders 
regularly undertook insider dealing161 in order to make private gains. This was typically 
carried out based on insider knowledge around the time of earnings announcements. 162 
Controlling insiders have carried out tunnelling or minority expropriation, such as diversion 
of company assets to other companies in the group, favourable transactions with related 
parties or other transactions to extract private benefit.163 A common practice has been to 
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undermine minority rights by dilution when rights offerings are carried out at deep 
discounts.164 At state-owned H-share issuers, the state as controlling insider has hurt 
minorities by imposing political or socio-economic agendas on the company, such as 
propping up other ailing state-owned companies or asset- stripping. Such issuers have also 
been subject to embezzlement by corrupt officers given the weak public governance in 
China.165  
However, other commentators have pointed out the benefits of blockholder-controlled 
companies. Family-owned and controlled companies are often in a good position to take a 
long-term view of the company’s prospects166 and to ignore the market noise arising from 
short-term fluctuations in share prices.167 Furthermore, some studies have suggested that 
family-owned and controlled companies in the region may have better and more 
sustainable stakeholder relationships. Rather than simply transactional counterparts, 
stakeholders are viewed by such companies as resources from a resource-dependency point 
of view.168 There is also empirical research169 which claims that family-owned and controlled 
companies have weathered crises better, showing less negative performance and more 
resilient returns on equity compared to companies with other ownership structures.  
The minority shareholder protection regimes in Hong Kong are found in company law, and 
listing rules pertaining to disclosure and corporate governance standards. The listing regime 
of the SEHK includes a corporate governance code which applies to issuers on a comply-or-
explain basis.170 However in 2011, the SEHK enhanced its corporate governance standards 
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by making some aspects of corporate governance part of the main Listing Rules and 
therefore mandatory for listed issuers.171 
La Porta el al have scored the minority protection regime in Hong Kong favourably,172 based 
on shareholders’ company law rights in the Companies Ordinance.173 The strong company 
law rights for minority shareholders in Hong Kong include rights to call a general meeting,174 
constitutional amendment rights,175 anti-director rights such as proxy by mail,176 one-share 
one-vote,177 rights at capital restructuring and reorganisation,178 and minority shareholder 
remedies.179  Directors’ duties are further imposed at common law based on English case 
law precedents.180 However, like in the UK, minority shareholder remedies rarely provide 
real minority shareholder protection on capital markets as litigation is rarely sought.181 
Some commentators have explained the lack of minority litigation in terms of the 
Confucian-infused Chinese culture that regards litigation with aversion, preferring informal 
and harmonious ways of dispute resolution.182 Moreover, the derivative action may be 
forbidding to litigants as a prima facie case has to be proved before the Court before 
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proceeding.183 Further, the judicial interpretation of directors’ duties seems less stringent 
than in the UK. The directors’ duty to exercise due care, skill and diligence is held in Hong 
Kong case law to be the same as laid down in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance,184 but the UK 
has since moved on to a more stringent standard of objective competent standards185 which 
takes account of director’s qualifications. 186   
Minority shareholder rights, powers and remedies in company law are a regime of law in the 
books inherited largely from the common law tradition. Yeung et al187 are of the view that 
these elements of company law inherited from the colonial heritage were essential in 
creating credibility for Hong Kong as a global listing regime. However, they are not generally 
utilised in civil enforcement. That said, the SEHK Listing Rules provide guidance for directors 
in terms of expected conduct, mirroring directors’ duties in company law.188 Its recent 
censure of two non-executive directors suggests that exchange-led enforcement could to 
some degree substitute for weak civil enforcement.189 
Minority shareholders in Hong Kong may also be protected via disclosure requirements in 
securities regulation, some of which are found in legislation (the Securities and Futures 
Ordinance) but most of them in the Listing Rules. The Main Board Listing Rules provide for 
periodic disclosure of financial information190 and half-yearly interim reports191 to be made 
by listed issuers to shareholders, and a general obligation to disclose inside information as 
reasonably as practicable in order to maintain a fair and orderly market.192 The maintenance 
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of a price-efficient market is a key measure of minority shareholder protection for the 
purposes of exit. 193 We are of the view that exit has always been of paramount importance 
to the shareholding community in Hong Kong as passive local investors (almost half of which 
is institutional and half of which are retail investors) are an important constituent of the 
ownership base.  
Minority shareholders are also protected via regulatory enforcement against market 
misconduct such as insider dealing.194 A recent case suggests that the main financial market 
regulator, the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), is increasing the robustness of its 
market interventions.195 Insider dealing prosecutions and civil enforcements have leapt 
since 2008, 196  coinciding with the increased share-ownership by foreign institutions 
(dominantly US institutions) of Hong Kong listed equity. It seems that the SFC may be 
responding to the needs of foreign shareholders, many of whom are institutions used to 
higher market efficiency standards in the New York and London markets.  
According to the HKEx annual surveys, the contribution of local investors to total market 
turnover decreased steadily from 2009/10197. By end 2012,198 overseas investors’ 
contribution at 46% exceeded the 38% contributed by local investors. The changes in the 
ownership landscape of Hong Kong listed equity coincide not only with increased market 
enforcement but also with developments in corporate governance standards such as in the 
introduction of independent directors, Board committees and special shareholder rights. 
In 2005, the Main Board of the SEHK adopted a corporate governance code subject to a 
comply-or-explain approach. The Code consists of two levels of recommendations - code 
provisions which are subject to comply or explain and recommended best practices that are 
guidelines only. Corporate governance reforms were further consulted upon in 2011 and 
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took effect in 2012. These elevate certain corporate governance standards to the status of 
mandatory listing rules.199  
The mandatory corporate governance standards that are part of the Listing Rules include 
the requirement to appoint a third of independent directors to the Board,200 to institute an 
audit committee comprising only of non-executive directors201 and to institute a 
remuneration committee202 chaired by an independent director and comprising of a 
majority of independent directors. The Listing Rules provide a non-exhaustive list of 
criteria203 for independence.204 
The Code provisions which are subject to comply-or-explain include the separation of the 
roles of Chairman and Chief Executive,205 the institution of a nomination committee,206 and 
facilitating effective shareholder communications and voting at general meetings.207 These 
standards are broadly in line with those included in the UK Corporate Governance Code. The 
Code provisions also provide for the Board’s role in assessing internal controls,208 duties of 
directors,209 principles regarding delegation of functions210 and supply of information to 
Boards.211 
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Optional provisions that are framed as best practice include requiring the audit committee 
to develop a whistle-blowing policy,212 the publication of quarterly financial information213 
and linking executive pay to corporate and individual performance.214  
In terms of shareholder rights and powers, the Listing Rules prescribe that ‘notifiable 
transactions’ need to be disclosed to shareholders, and generally require shareholder 
approval.215 ‘Notifiable transactions’ include share transactions, discloseable transactions, 
major transactions, very substantial disposals (or acquisitions) that meet one or more ratio 
thresholds such as the asset, profit, revenue, capital or consideration ratios as defined in the 
Listing Rules.216  
Furthermore, minority shareholders unconnected with blockholders in a company are given 
special powers where connected transactions are concerned. Certain transactions with 
connected persons217 have to be approved by a majority of independent shareholders.218 
Connected transactions include acquisitions or disposals of interests in the listed issuer, 
favourable subscriptions for shares, financial assistance, options granting and joint 
ventures.219 The Listing Rules prescribe the information that needs to be circulated to 
shareholders, including the advice of an independent financial adviser.220 The independent 
shareholders are defined as being not connected persons or persons not having a material 
interest in the connected transaction in question.221 
We observe a coincidence in the rise in the importance of corporate governance standards 
in Hong Kong with the rise in foreign institutional ownership of Hong Kong listed equity. This 
seems to suggest that foreign minority shareholders regard corporate governance standards 
                                                          
212
 Para C.3.8, above. 
213
 Para C.1.6, above. 
214
 Para B.1.7, above. 
215
 Chapter 14, Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Main Board Listing Rules. 
216
 Where share transactions or discloseable transactions are concerned (such as where the listed issuer 
acquires assets using securities that are publicly traded or where the listed issuer engages in a series of 
transactions that meet at least 5% of one of the 5 ratios mentioned above), shareholder approval is not 
required but disclosure obligations are triggered. Rule 14.33, above. 
217
 defined as persons with previous affiliations with the listed issuer, business relations, oversight relations or 
family relations ,Rule 14A.11, Chapter 14A. 
218
 Rule 14A.02, above. 
219
 Rule 14A.13, above. 
220
 Rule 14A.21, above. 
221
 Rule 14A.18, above. 
as important for minority shareholder protection. Empirical studies on Hong Kong listed 
issuers shows that independent directors are valued by the capital markets and investors 
reward these issuers with higher valuations.222 There is a body223 of empirical research 
which suggests that Hong Kong issuers that have instituted corporate governance 
frameworks in accordance with the Listing Rules and Corporate Governance Code enjoy 
better investor perceptions than their non-complying peers. Sun et al224 also find that 
Chinese ‘H’ share issuers substantively improve their corporate governance practices when 
listing in Hong Kong, based on an in-depth case study of the Bank of China. 
Institutional investors appear to be exerting influence upon investee companies to improve 
their governance225. The appointment of minority shareholder rights activist David Webb226 
to the Board of the HKEx in 2003 and the profile of annual surveys carried out by BDO227 on 
the state of corporate governance in Hong Kong suggest that minority institutional concerns 
are being brought to bear on the SEHK and SFC228. The preference for prescriptive corporate 
governance standards and wider scrutiny of adherence to such standards is certainly on the 
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rise in Hong Kong, as the market becomes more attractive to international listings and 
investors.  
The SEHK and SFC seem determined to maintain the level of minority shareholder 
protection framed by corporate governance standards as well as the ‘branding’ appeal 
achieved by the institution of these standards. The determination of the SEHK and SFC not 
to water down corporate governance standards was particularly apparent in the recent 
episode involving the proposed flotation of Alibaba.com in Hong Kong. 229   
The loss of Alibaba.com’s potential listing in Hong Kong due to a failure to agree on an 
acceptable governance structure between issuer and regulator has caused fury in the 
investment and professional services industries due to the loss of fee revenues such 
flotation would have generated.  SEHK in response has decided to consult on the way 
forward for its corporate governance standards.230 However, institutional investors are 
firmly supportive231 of maintaining existing standards. The buy-side in Hong Kong will be 
crucial in sustaining a level of minority shareholder protection characterised by well-
accepted ex ante corporate governance standards.  
In this brief study of the Hong Kong listing regime, we observe that traditional ‘law in the 
books’ valued by La Porta et al (in research dating back almost 15 years), i.e. in the areas of 
company law rights, do not seem to be the places where minority shareholders find their 
protection being realised. Securities regulation has since the advent of the Securities and 
Futures Ordinance and increased empowerment of the SFC232 been more relevant to 
investor protection in (a) sustaining corporate disclosure obligations; (b) cracking down 
against market abuse and (c) introducing corporate governance standards as part of the 
listing regime. The rise of foreign institutional ownership of Hong Kong listed equity seems 
to have exerted significant influence upon reforms in regulatory enforcement against insider 
dealing and the development of corporate governance standards in listing rules.  
Minority expropriation problems have been a long-running feature in the block-held 
corporate economy in Hong Kong, but it is interesting to observe that the SEHK has adopted 
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both the strategies of adhering to generic best standards as well as tailor-made rules. The 
key generic best practice adopted is in ensuring the quantity and quality of independent 
directors on Boards. It seems that even in the predominantly block-held landscape in Hong 
Kong, similar standards are seen as applicable in mitigating the principal-principal agency 
problems.  
However, it is important that the development of such standards is not a matter of mere 
transplantation but is considered within the unique business contexts, and pros and cons of 
block-held governance structures in Hong Kong. That said, unique Hong Kong solutions in 
providing for minority shareholder rights such as in notifiable and connected transactions 
have arguably been developed in a way sensitive to the Hong Kong market. Further, 
blockholder expropriation is mitigated by making voting by poll mandatory and requiring 
independent shareholder approval of connected transactions.  
 
D. Final Observations and Conclusions  
Our review of three major listing regimes suggests that minority shareholder protection 
frameworks are vibrant and evolving, but company law regimes have become less relevant 
to such frameworks compared to developments in securities regulation. Company law 
frameworks for minority shareholder protection in the UK and Hong Kong are well regarded 
in terms of anti-director rights and shareholder powers, but civil enforcement is largely 
illusory. In the US, minority shareholder powers are comparatively weak and Delaware 
company law in particular is significantly pro-director.  
However, these relative strengths and weaknesses in company law frameworks have not 
affected stock market development pronouncedly. The US and UK remain the favourite 
investor destinations for listed equity233 and Hong Kong is a very vibrant market in the Asia-
Pacific.234 It may be argued that ‘company law’ does not matter, or does not matter 
significantly. A more optimistic interpretation is that the company law frameworks continue 
to support a minimum branding appeal even if there is negligible investor reliance on them. 
Securities regulation regimes in all three jurisdictions have become more important than 
company law for developing minority shareholder protection. In particular, all three 
jurisdictions are broadly convergent along high standards of corporate transparency, timely 
disclosure and regulatory enforcement for maintaining market fairness and efficiency. In 
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addition, there is a tradition of vibrant private securities litigation in the US235 which can be 
employed against failings in corporate disclosure and insider dealing. There is also a marked 
increase in enforcement against insider dealing by authorities in the US,236 UK and Hong 
Kong. The prospect of fair and efficient exit on stock markets seems to be important to 
institutional investors, and we conclude that ‘securities regulation matters’ to the appeal 
and branding of a listing regime. In global securities markets, investor protection is 
increasingly regarded as a public good provided in securities regulation instead of 
contractarian arrangements- a fundamental conception that still underlies company law- 237  
A key finding from our study is the increased importance of corporate governance standards, 
developed as part of the framework of listing rules (and arguably securities regulation), in all 
three jurisdictions. A mixture of reasons explains the appeal of corporate governance 
standards – particularly their potential to provide ex ante oversight of corporate behaviour 
(‘defensive’ reasons) and as a means of facilitating shareholder engagement and activism 
(‘offensive’ reasons).238  
Corporate governance standards can be adopted as law, such as in the US Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act 2002,239 or more usually in listing rules that are contractually mandatory for listed 
issuers,240 but not treated as part of regulatory law. We observe that corporate governance 
standards developed in all three jurisdictions have tended to become more prescriptive over 
time. 241 This trend raises the question as to the legal nature of listing rules242 and the long-
                                                          
235
 R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes and A Shleifer, ‘What Works in Securities Laws’ (2006) 71 Journal of Finance 1. 
236
 Such as former New York Attorney-General Eliot Spitzer’s crackdown on insider dealing and white collar 
crime in general where the SEC has failed to pursue such cases. 
237
 Coase’s ‘Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4(16) Economica 386–405 remains the foundation for contractarianism, 
see exposition in William A Klein, “The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints” (1982) 
91 Yale Law Journal 1521; Fred McChesney, “Contractarianism Without Contracts? Yet Another Critique Of 
Eisenberg” (1990) 90 Columbia Law Rev 1332; Manuel A Utset, “Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm” 
(1995) 80 Cornell Law Review 540; Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, “The Corporate Contract” in The 
Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press 1991) at 1ff;  David Charny, 
“Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure Of Contract Interpretation” (1991) 89 Michigan Law Review 
1815;  Stephen Bainbridge, “Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive 
Corporate Law Scholarship” (1997) 82 Cornell Law Review 856. 
238
 See Iris H-Y Chiu, The Foundations and Anatomy of Shareholder Activism (Oxford: Hart, 2010) on offensive 
and defensive forms of activism. 
239
 Pub.L. 107–204. 
240
 the UK Corporate Governance Code for example. 
241
 Luigi Zingales, ‘The Future of Securities Regulation’ (2009) 47 Journal of Accounting Research 391. 
242
 Whether listing rules should amount to law. Hall v Cable and Wireless Plc [2009] EWHC 1793 (Comm) in the 
UK seems to suggest that listing rules are not law since they are not regarded as regulatory law. In Hong Kong, 
term prospects for soft law approaches to corporate governance,243  as corporate 
governance standards become increasingly integral to modern securities regulation. There 
seems to be a significant buy-side underpinning of greater prescription.244 Global assets 
under management total $64 trillion according to a survey carried out by Price Waterhouse 
Coopers245 and are forecast to swell to $102 trillion by 2020. Global assets under 
management will increasingly dwarf any individual country’s GDP and the investment 
management sector is increasingly powerful in influencing the terms upon which 
investments are made, including in equity and securities markets. Demands for robustly 
implemented governance standards in listed issuers are one manifestation of institutional 
investors’ preferences and these will likely grow.246  
Broad patterns of international convergence can be found in corporate governance 
standards that address the agency problem of overly-powerful management in widely-held 
companies.. 247 In particular, independent Board representation has become a key building 
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block in corporate governance standards. Such convergence is arguably driven by the 
dominant influence of the Anglo-American institutional fund management sector.248 
Empirical literature has measured convergence in corporate governance standards 
internationally and records that notable convergence has taken place in standards that are 
particularly valued for minority shareholder protection.249 However, regional 
fragmentations in corporate governance standards250  show that the dialectics of contention 
between issuers, investors and policy-makers will continue to sustain some of the unique 
differences in corporate governance standards upheld in each securities market.251  
What standards ought to be employed to deal with the governance issues of blockholder-
controlled companies is still very much a developing issue, despite the fact that the majority 
of companies in the world are block-held rather than widely held.252 The dynamic growth in 
the corporate sector in many emerging economies will bring more block-held companies to 
the world stage.253 Many of these companies will have evolved out of state ownership or 
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family ownership254, and will wish to gain exposure to global equity markets. The buy-side 
with rising global assets under management will also feel increasingly pressured to find 
opportunities for investment and yield. Regulators will have to respond to the accelerating 
collision of these two very different business cultures.  
The slowness to-date in developing standards for block-held companies is probably due to 
the dominance of Anglo-American corporate governance frameworks based on the widely-
held structure. Such an unrepresentative but dominant view of corporate governance is 
arguably sustained (a) ideologically and academically in the finance perspective of 
economies featuring many widely-held large corporations, and (b) by institutional demands, 
notably those made by Western institutions and asset managers used to corporate 
governance standards in dispersed ownership economies.  
Dealing with the unfortunate experiences of ENRC, Bumi and Essar Energy has given the FCA 
the opportunity to determine what corporate governance standards should be introduced in 
order to deal with blockholder-controlled companies and whether soft law is the 
appropriate medium. The introduction of the Enhanced Listing Regime is measured and 
incremental in nature. Perhaps tailored and more prescriptive governance standards may be 
more appropriate for block-held structures.255 By partitioning a separate Regime for issuers 
with controlling shareholders, the FCA has arguably rejected a one-size-fits-all approach in 
setting corporate governance standards by catering for the unique needs of minority 
shareholders in block-held companies. In this way, the overall status and nature of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code is also maintained for the dominant quarter of widely-held 
companies in the equity market. We support this approach, and would not favour any 
wholesale shift towards integrating or harmonising corporate governance standards across 
all ownership structures and market sectors or the over-standardisation of corporate 
governance through regulation. 
Negative perceptions of block-held companies have not emerged to the same extent in the 
US, which appears comfortable, for now, with the blockholder-dominated control structures 
of some of its most successful technology companies. In contrast, Hong Kong has long been 
aware of the dangers of blockholder expropriation, given the prevalence of concentrated 
ownership in its domestic issuers, with the result that it already incorporates a range of 
shareholders powers (related to significant and related party transactions) in its listing rules.  
                                                          
254
 See for eg Tarun Khanna and Yishay Yafeh, ‘Business Groups in Emerging Market- Paragons or Parasites?’ 
(2005) at http://cei.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/activities/seminars/papers/yafeh%2005.pdf; Mauro F Guillen and Esteban 
Garcia-Canal, Emerging Markets Rule (NY: McGraw-Hill Professional, 2012). 
255
 Also see see Victor Zitian Chen, Jing Li and Daniel M Shapiro, ‘Are OECD-prescribed “Good Corporate 
Governance Practices” Really Good in an Emerging Economy?’ (2011) 28 Asia Pacific Journal of Management 
115. 
The UK’s Enhanced Listing Regime should be viewed as a pioneering but experimental 
framework. Our hope is that as it evolves, policy makers will take a balanced view of the 
pros and cons of block-held structures.256 The governance fiascos of Bumi, ENRC and Essar 
Energy have been a painful experience for the UK equity market. But we hope that they will 
not blind the UK to the benefits of an ownership structure which, in an appropriate 
institutional context, can offer economic opportunities as well as risks.  
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